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PREFACE 
his report is divided into two main parts. Section 1 contains the 
views expressed during the meetings of an earlier CEPS Task Force 
on e-communications, “Policy Challenges for the Information 
Superhighway”, which was active between September 2005 and June 
2006. Among the 54 participants and 28 invited guests and speakers were 
representatives of European telecoms operators, telecoms manufacturers, 
industry associations, consultancy firms, law firms, distinguished 
scholars in the field and representatives from national regulators, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament.  . 
Section 2 summarises the findings of the latest CEPS Task Force 
“Achieving the Internal Market for e-communications”, which met 
during the period September-December 2007. The first two meetings of 
this group focused on issues such as functional separation, the list of 
relevant markets, the ladder of investment, geographical segmentation of 
markets and spectrum policy. The third meeting was held after the 
European Commission presented the proposed review on 13 November 
2007, and was dedicated to an extensive analysis of the proposals. This 
discussion led to the drafting of an interim report, which was presented 
at the European Parliament on 29 January 2008. A final Task Force 
meeting was then held again in the European Parliament on 9 April 2008.  
This present report is the result of a collective effort, and profits 
from views of some of the most distinguished scholars in this field, as 
well as from the lively debate that took place during the Task Force 
meetings, animated by industry players, representatives of the European 
Commission, national regulatory authorities (OFCOM in the UK), the 
European Parliament and the European Investment Bank.  
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1.  FINDINGS OF THE 2005-06 CEPS TASK 
FORCE 
n the 11th and 12th Reports on the implementation of the 2002 new 
regulatory framework (NRF) for electronic communications, the 
European Commission noted an increased take-up of broadband lines, 
significant penetration of 2G mobile services, encouraging development 
of 3G and online applications such as VoIP and a resurgence of M&As in 
Europe. Available evidence shows, however, that Europe is still lagging 
behind the US in terms of investment in infrastructure and productivity 
growth. In addition, whereas some of the member states of the European 
Union are performing quite well in terms of competition and growth, 
others (including some of the EU15) inevitably lag behind.  
This mixed picture raises a key question: Were the latest encouraging 
results achieved because of the NRF or independently of the NRF? The 
CEPS Task Force “Policy Challenges for the Information Superhighway” 
observed that the implementation of the 2002 regulatory framework for 
electronic communications has been delayed by a number of concurrent 
factors. As a result, it was too early to state that the NRF has significantly 
contributed to economic growth and employment in the European Union 
(see Renda, 2006).  
While the European Commission was working on the review of the 
NRF, which led to the Communication adopted in June 2006, the CEPS 
Task Force “Policy Challenges for the Information Superhighway” 
engaged in a very lively discussion on the following three issues:  
•  problems that have emerged in the implementation of the NRF; 
•  transitional measures that could be taken before the entry into force 
of the future framework; and 
•  suggestions on how to amend the NRF. 
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Below, we report some of the main findings reached by the CEPS 
Task Force and included in the Final Report, Last call for Lisbon? 
Suggestions for the Future Regulation of e-communications in Europe, 
published by CEPS in June 2007. As will immediately be clear to the 
reader, many of these suggestions are still valid, one year later, and can 
be applied to the current proposal presented by the Commission in 
November 2007.  
1.1  Problems that emerged in the implementation of the NRF 
The CEPS Task Force was concerned about several issues that emerged in 
the implementation of the NRF, as outlined below. 
•  Concern was raised that market analyses are too resource-intensive and 
time-consuming for both national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and 
market players. As acknowledged also by Commissioner Viviane 
Reding, it is not an easy task to define at least 450 markets in a 
timely manner, which adds considerable complexity to the NRF. 
Moreover, NRAs had to cope with new policy tools – partially 
borrowed from competition policy practice – and this might have 
slowed down the process even further. A cause of delay in the 
implementation of the NRF was also the suspensory effect of appeal 
procedures before the national courts, which also deserve careful 
attention in the upcoming review. 
•  Other problems have emerged as a result of the fact that the NRF has 
only partially adopted the tools of competition policy. The equation 
between a finding of SMP (significant market power), i.e. 
dominance, and the application of regulatory remedies might be 
justified by the need to open up previous monopolies (e.g. by 
mandating access to incumbents’ fixed networks), but is far less 
justified where no previous monopolies existed (e.g. in mobile 
termination). To be sure, with the migration to IP-based (internet 
protocol) networks, such a link will become weaker. In addition, 
concerns emerged on the partial application of the ‘three-criteria test’.1 
                                                      
1 The ‘three-criteria test’ is an economic test developed by the Commission to 
check whether a market should be subject to ex ante regulation. The three criteria 
are: 1) the presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers of a structural, legal 
or regulatory nature, 2) a market structure that does not tend towards effective 
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Uncertainty might emerge since the three-criteria test is to be 
considered as a gating mechanism to decide whether or not it is 
appropriate to carry out a market review in a specific sector or 
market. However, peculiar features of national markets may 
suggest the definition of relevant markets that are either narrower 
or (more likely) broader than those listed in the Recommendation. If 
the three-criteria test is applied only as an ex ante gating 
mechanism generally valid for the EU25, then regulatory 
intervention might end up being less precise than it would be with 
a full application of the three criteria.  
•  The Task Force observes that the ‘ladder of investment’ model 
adopted by most NRAs still has to fully demonstrate its potential to 
promote investments and infrastructure-based competition in the EU27. 
Recent empirical evidence – especially in some EU member states – 
is consistent with the ladder hypothesis, as it shows a decrease in 
resale accompanied by an increase of bitstream access and shared 
access in Europe.2 At the same time, more recent empirical studies 
have shown strong evidence that mandatory network sharing 
significantly affects incentives to invest in alternative technologies.3 
However, the Task Force agreed that: 1) it is too early to draw 
conclusions on the actual explanatory power of the investment 
ladder metaphor, and 2) the ladder model should not lead NRAs to 
micro-manage market evolution.  
•  The Task Force also agreed that the treatment of emerging markets 
under the NRF leads to regulatory uncertainty. NRAs should be given 
more guidance on how to identify emerging markets: the current 
approach leads to a short-circuit between the technology-neutrality 
principle and regulatory forbearance for new services, and the 
SSNIP test – currently recommended – seems far from appropriate, 
as it often leads to a denial that an emerging market is really 
separate from an already existing one. 
                                                                                                                                    
competition within the relevant time horizon and 3) the insufficiency of 
competition law alone to address the market failure(s) above.  
2 See M. Cave, presentation at the CEPS Task Force, 7 November 2007. 
3 See Röller (2007) and Waverman et al. (2007). See also Wallsten (2007). 4 | FINDINGS OF THE 2005-06 CEPS TASK FORCE 
 
•  The Article 7 procedure is not responsible for the lengthy 
implementation of the NRF, but might prove burdensome in the future. 
Its scope should be clarified to make it more sustainable in the long 
term, and consistent with principles of better regulation.  
1.2  Transitional measures 
As the future framework will become effective only in 2010, the Task 
Force suggests that the European Commission should consider the 
following transitional measures: 
•  The list of relevant markets can be shortened by removing retail markets 
and some of the wholesale markets. In particular: 
-  Retail markets may be removed from the list if key wholesale 
services are already subject to unbundling obligations; 
-  Wholesale markets 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 should be retained in 
the list; 
-  Markets 10, 14, 15, 17 and 18 may be removed; and 
-  Market 16 may be kept in the list, but it should be 
accompanied by a careful application of the peculiar 
economics of mobile termination.  
•  Action should be taken by NRAs to encourage investments in NGNs (next 
generation networks). There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution for 
promoting investments in new infrastructure in the EU25, and the 
best option might differ depending on market conditions. For 
example, countries in which more than two platforms are already 
available (or are likely to emerge in the short run) might profit from 
regulatory forbearance more than countries with less than two 
platforms. An alternative possibility is to agree upon temporary 
access regulation (sunset clauses) so as to smooth the build-up of 
new infrastructure both by incumbents and other licensed operators 
(OLOs).   
•  In the future framework, spectrum policy should seek a more 
coordinated, pan-European approach, promoting spectrum 
liberalisation and trading as a key driver of growth and 
employment, while at the same time bearing in mind that the 
availability of harmonised spectrum resources is crucial. Existing 
spectrum rights should not be undermined; however, as technology ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 5 
 
advances, the Commission is paying increased attention to mixed 
collective approaches to spectrum allocation. 
1.3  Suggestions for the review 
The Task Force suggests a number of changes to be introduced in the 
future regulatory framework. Such changes would at once ensure 
continuity for NRAs, regulatory certainty for industry players and make 
the necessary adaptation of the theoretical framework to the competitive 
dynamics of future IP (internet protocol)-based networks.  
•  In the future framework, the review of an NRA’s decision should be 
streamlined in order to make it more efficient and sustainable: 
-  the scope of the Article 7 review should be clarified, and 
extended to cover spectrum policy decisions; and 
-  measures aimed at preventing lengthy appeals procedures 
should be envisaged. 
•  The ‘competition policy dimension’ of the NRF could be strengthened:  
-  the automatic application of remedies on SMP players should 
be reconsidered; 
-  the three-criteria test should be awarded a higher status and 
included in the text of the future Framework Directive; and 
-  multi-sided market issues should be duly taken into account 
when assessing SMP in future markets. 
•  The ‘better regulation dimension’ in the NRF should be strengthened by 
introducing the following modules of impact assessment in NRAs’ 
decisions: 
-  identification of alternative policy options; 
-  application of the three-criteria test to the preferred policy 
option; 
-  public (on-line) consultation with stakeholders;  
-  assessment of the impact on the internal market and 
consistency with the acquis; and 
-  assessment of the proportionality of the chosen remedy. 
•  Spectrum policy should be awarded an important role in the future 
framework. Coordination/harmonisation of national spectrum 
allocation procedures should be achieved by reinstating a 6 | FINDINGS OF THE 2005-06 CEPS TASK FORCE 
 
coordination mechanism in the text of the Framework Directive 
similar to that provided in Article 7 of the NRF – as had been 
decided initially by the Commission when preparing the current 
Framework Directive.  However, the proposed changes in spectrum 
policy should not undermine existing frequency rights, especially 
when such rights have been assigned through an auction process. 
Regulatory certainty and commitment are vital for ensuring 
adequate incentives to (re)invest.   
•  The scope of universal service should be made less technology-specific. The 
Task Force recommends that under the review of the NRF, the need 
for universal service obligations to provide the minimum set of 
leased lines is assessed by NRAs only for specific and limited 
geographical areas deemed structurally uncompetitive in the long 
term. The Universal Service Directive should not establish any 
obligation to provide a minimum set of leased lines on a nation-
wide basis, and should be limited to those cases in which market 
forces alone cannot deliver the expected universal service.  
Table 1. Main proposals for the review contained in the previous Task Force 
Report 
Issue NRF  Future  framework 
Three-criteria test 
Not included in the 
Framework Directive 
Included in Art. 15 of the 
Framework Directive 
Link SMP-remedies  Automatic Not  automatic 
Scope of Article 7 
review 
NRAs draft measures 
affecting internal market, 
policy objectives and 
consistency with the 
acquis, but excluding 
national measures on 
spectrum 
NRAs draft measures 
affecting internal market, 
policy objectives and 
consistency with the acquis, 
after impact assessment by 
NRAs, including national 
measures on spectrum 
Scrutiny by 
national courts 
(Art. 4) 
Appeal to an independent 
body, which may be a 
court, with optional 
suspensory effect 
Appeal to an independent 
body, with time limits, and  
suspensory effect only under 
exceptional circumstances 
Impact assessment 
No mandatory IAs for 
NRAs 
Mandatory, ‘light touch’ IA 
for NRAs 
Spectrum policy  No coordination  
Coordination through 
Article 7 review 
Universal service  PSTN-based Technology  neutral 
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2.  MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 
CEPS TASK FORCE  
his section summarises the main findings of the current CEPS Task 
Force, meeting in 2007-08, with a view to stimulating further 
reflection during the co-decision process. The next section (2.1) 
describes the reaction of Task Force members to the new proposed list of 
relevant markets, and section 2.2 illustrates pending issues as regards the 
regulatory approach to be adopted on Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGANs). Section 2.3 describes our findings as regards functional 
separation. Section 2.4 deals with current proposals on spectrum policy, 
with specific emphasis on the new Communication on the digital 
dividend included in the proposed review. Section 2.5 contains some 
suggestions as regards institutional and governance issues, including the 
trade-off between the creation of a pan-European Authority or the 
institutionalisation of the ERG (EECMA or BERT), and the extension of 
the Commission’s veto power over remedies chosen by NRAs. Section 3 
presents two country case studies from two countries that are seldom 
brought to the attention of EU policy-makers – Romania and Turkey. 
Finally, section 4 concludes, by summarising the main findings of the 
Task Force. 
2.1  The list of relevant markets 
•  The CEPS Task Force agrees with the Commission’s decision to reduce 
the list of relevant markets by removing most of the retail markets. 
The new proposal, in fact, mirrors to a large extent what the 
previous CEPS Task Force had suggested in June 2006 (with 
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significant exceptions, such as former market 17, now regulated 
separately, and market 1, which remained in the list), and is in line 
with the opinions expressed in the current Task Force.4  
•  At the same time, the CEPS Task Force wishes to recall that a 
reduction of the list does not imply the deregulation of the e-
communications sector, or the impossibility to regulate certain 
markets, should the conditions for ex ante intervention emerge or 
persist.  
•  In addition, the prospective reduction of the list will not necessarily 
lead to less regulation. During the Task Force meetings, it was 
pointed out that most of the markets removed are currently either 
not regulated at all or are subject to light regulation. Secondly, a lot 
will depend on the market definition that will be adopted, with 
some markets being now broader than before (former market 11).5 
•  A reduction of the list is in line with better regulation principles. As a 
matter of fact, during the first years of implementation of the 2002 
framework, NRAs had a clear incentive to define relevant markets 
in line with the list included in the 2003 Commission 
Recommendation, since deviating from that list would have meant 
having to run the three-criteria test. Removing markets from the list 
means that NRAs will have to explicitly show that the conditions 
for ex ante regulation are met in their specific jurisdiction – in line 
with the principle that there should be ‘no regulation without 
justification’.  
•  The suggested prioritisation of market analyses (so-called 
“modified greenfield approach”) further strengthens the alignment 
of the new framework with better regulation principles: as a matter 
of fact, demonstrating that ex ante regulation is necessary in a given 
market requires proof that other attempts to regulate other 
                                                      
4 On market 15, see Ulrich Stumpf’s presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS 
Task Force and that of Lars Backlund and Giuseppe Rossi on market 18.  
5 See presentation by Henning Never (Deutsche Telekom) at the first meeting of 
the CEPS Task Force.  ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 9 
 
(upstream) markets did not create the conditions for long-run 
competition.6  
•  However, the effect of the reduction of the relevant markets and of the 
prioritisation of market analyses may be smaller than expected, if NRAs 
do not have to motivate their decisions when regulating markets 
included in the (revised) Recommendation. In this respect, the 
Commission proposal only partially hits the target. 
•  The CEPS Task Force considers that geographical segmentation in 
market definition, besides the geographical differentiation of 
remedies,  is essential to ensure that markets evolve towards 
sustainable competition overtime. Such a need was advocated by 
scholars, regulator and players active in many countries, including 
the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Romania.7 Proposals discussed 
by Task Force participants include:  
o  The definition of ‘cabled areas’ as geographically separate markets: 
in these areas, NRAs could consider backing away from 
access regulation due to infrastructure-based competition.8 
o  The use of local switches as basic geographical unit (BGU) in market 
definition: as a matter of fact, most of the current regulatory 
remedies for (former) markets 11 and 12 are related to the 
areas covered by the local switches.9 This option is also 
backed by international references (UK, Canada).  
•  Some of the relevant markets should be analysed in light of advanced 
economic tools, such as two-sided market theories:  
o  The removal of market 15 has long been advocated by the CEPS 
Task Force, as this market is found to be competitive in many 
EU countries. In addressing this market, NRAs should 
                                                      
6 See U. Stumpf, op.cit. Another proposal that was discussed in the Task Force to 
streamline market analyses in the next years was to analyse markets 11 and 12 
together, as BSA is more a remedy than a market. See Deutsche Telekom’s 
presentation (Never, 2007) at the first meeting of the CEPS Task Force. 
7 See presentation by Romtelecom, 9 April 2008.  
8 See Martin Cave, presentation at the second meeting of the CEPS Task Force. 
9 A. Acebal (Telefónica SA), presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task 
Force. 10 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
consider whether there can be a restriction of competition on 
one side of the market, if the other side is fully competitive.10 
o  As regards market 18,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  i n t e r -
platform competition is duly taken into account: defining 
technology-specific markets (i.e. ignoring inter-platform 
competition between, say, satellite, cable and xDSL platforms) 
would fail to accurately portray the competitive landscape in 
the broadcasting sector as it appears today. In addition, as 
broadcasting markets are multi-sided markets, where 
operators using different technologies compete for the same 
customers, the current shift of SMP towards content providers 
should be taken into account.  
•  More generally, the proposed package provides little guidance to NRAs 
on market analysis. Areas where more guidance would be needed are 
certainly the application of the three-criteria test; the application of 
‘cluster market’ concepts;11 the approach to emerging markets; and 
the application of margin-squeeze tests in an all-IP context and 
under functional separation, etc.   
•  Finally,  it is not clear what will happen for those markets that are 
currently regulated, but have been removed from the list – an example 
being market 18 in many countries. NRAs should be called upon to 
revisit such market analyses as soon as possible, under the basic 
assumption that these markets are not eligible for continued ex ante 
regulation.  
 
KEY MESSAGE 1 
•  The CEPS Task Force agrees with the proposed shortening of the 
list of relevant markets, and acknowledges that the European 
Commission’s proposal mirrors most of the suggestions included in 
the Final Report of the previous CEPS Task Force on e-
communications for the period 2005-06.  
                                                      
10 U. Stumpf, presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task Force. 
11 There is indeed a chapter on bundling in the paper accompanying the new 
Recommendation, but it is unclear how this will translate into actual practice.  ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 11 
 
•  However, the expected reduction in the level of regulation is 
uncertain; the lack of clear guidance to NRAs and the lack of clear 
rules on market definition and emerging markets may jeopardise 
the effect of this appreciable initiative.  
•  More guidance and training to NRAs are needed to ensure that 
current regulatory tools are properly applied.  In particular 
guidance on geographical segmentation and the application of the 
three-criteria test are needed to ensure that markets evolve towards 
sustainable competition.  
•  For markets that are currently regulated, but have been removed 
from the list, the NRAs should be obliged to perform new market 
analyses as soon as possible.  
 
2.2  Incentives to invest in next generation networks 
•  Encouraging investment in the roll-out of Next Generation Access 
Network infrastructure is key for the competitiveness of Europe. 
The number of FTTH connections in Europe reached 1 million at the 
end of 2007, with peaks currently in Sweden and Italy and a fast 
development in countries like France.12 At the same time, Europe 
significantly lags behind the US, Japan and Korea in the 
deployment of these new network infrastructures, with Japan 
having reached already 11 million subscribers. Figure 1 below 
shows the current ranking in terms of household penetration of 
FTTH or FTTB+LAN, as published by the FTTH Council on 28 
February 2008.  
                                                      
12 IDATE News 407, 28 February 2008.  12 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
Figure 1. Economies with more than 1% penetration of FTTH/FTTB+LAN 
 
 
•  The proposed review of the regulatory framework adopted by the 
Commission in November 2007 lacks clear provisions on the 
regulatory approach to be adopted vis-à-vis Next Generation Access 
Networks. As investing in NGANs is essential for the 
competitiveness of the EU27 and the transition towards the 
‘information society for all’, the CEPS Task Force believes that more 
regulatory certainty should be ensured on a number of issues related to 
NGANs.  
•  The traditional regulatory concept for access regulation focused on 
regulated access to existing telecommunications networks. In the 
context of legacy access regulation, regulation took place in a rather 
static environment. Regulated access was understood as a means to 
create effective competition in the former monopolistic markets 
mainly by redistributing market shares from the incumbent to new 
entrants.  This ‘old regulatory approach’ was successful as long as the 
political aim was confined to redistribution, but it is deficient for providing 
incentives for investments in new infrastructure, namely Next Generation 
Access Networks (NGANs). ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 13 
 
•  Markets susceptible to ex ante regulation will remain a moving 
target during the migration to all-IP NGNs.13 The main problems 
include: 
o  The way in which new wholesale products will affect market 
definitions and the 3-criteria test; 
o  Access to sub-loop and fibre loop; 
o  Backhaul, duct and in-house wiring sharing; 
o  New WBA products; and 
o  New IP interconnect products, impact of new charging 
regimes (bill & keep) on termination markets.14 
•  There are potentially very significant problems stemming from the 
application of current regulatory tools to all-IP networks. These include 
market definition, the assessment of SMP in a multi-sided market 
environment, the application of margin squeeze tests when 
competitors have widely diverging cost structures, etc. At the same 
time, some participants also observed that phasing out regulation 
right away might constitute a risk.  
•  To be sure, the migration towards NGNs will dramatically affect the 
‘investment ladder’ model, by completely changing the architecture of 
networks.15 Although opinions on the functioning of the ladder as a 
regulatory model for Europe are still mixed, there is full 
convergence on the need to provide for an update of the regulatory 
tools used by NRAs.16  
•  In an all-IP world, the main legacy bottlenecks are represented by 
civil engineering works, and in particular ducts, which represent 
                                                      
13 U. Stumpf, presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task Force. 
14 See U. Stumpf, presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task Force; and 
Alexander De Streel, presentation at the third meeting of the CEPS Task Force. 
15 See Martin Cave, presentation at the second meeting of the CEPS Task Force. 
16 Some recent empirical studies have found that regulation ultimately hampers 
investment in alternative infrastructure, a finding which contrasts with the 
“ladder” approach (Waverman et al., 2007; Röller, 2007). At the same time, 
Martin Cave showed evidence that is consistent with the ladder hypothesis 
during the second Task Force meeting, in November 2007). 14 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
more than 50% of Capex for a new network.17 Many Task Force 
members – including fixed-line operators – considered duct-sharing as 
a potentially viable solution to enable the endowment of more than one player 
with adequate infrastructure  to provide their services, provided that all 
ducts – not only the incumbents’, are subject to this regulatory 
approach. Ducts, masts or other essential civil works infrastructure of 
all owners, including all other existing ducts of alternative 
telecommunications operators, other utilities and public undertakings 
as well as those owned by local communities, could be made available 
in order to facilitate infrastructure-based competition and to lower 
barriers to entry for all market players.18  
Recently, several fixed line telecom operators that participate in the CEPS 
Task Force have proposed measures for a sustainable solution to ensure a 
more effective and efficient approach to the roll-out of NGA 
infrastructure. The proposal seeks to incorporate all major political 
objectives related to NGA, including the provision of appropriate 
incentives to invest in order to close the ‘investment gap’, ensuring fast 
penetration and usage of the NGAs to the benefit of consumers, and 
allowing entry and participation of alternative operators by means of 
mandatory regulated access. The main principles underlying the proposal 
are described below. 
•  As a general rule, regulation should focus on the deployment and 
availability of basic infrastructure like ducts and masts in order to facilitate 
market entry and network roll-outs by third parties.  
•  Geographical segmentation can promote NGA infrastructure investment, if 
the local competitive situation is taken duly into account, and 
represents a suitable model towards gradual deregulation. 
                                                      
17 See V. Hennes (France Telecom), presentation at the third meeting of the CEPS 
Task Force. 
18 Such alternative basic infrastructures are already widely used in a lot of 
regions. For example, sewers are used in Paris, Tokyo (850km), Vienna (400km), 
Hamburg (100km) and Berlin (50km); gas and water systems are being examined 
as potential conduits for FTTH networks and technology developed in recent 
years has demonstrated the ability to safely and efficiently transmit data through 
cable systems installed inside gas or water pipes; aerial FTTH installation is ideal 
when an overhead infrastructure exists and is very fast and cost effective (see 
OECD, 2008).  ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 15 
 
•  In areas where this is not sufficient and sustainable competition is 
unlikely to develop, access obligations to the sole NGA infrastructure 
must be granted. This means obligating NGAN operators that exclusively 
serve a particular area to grant access to other NGAN operators on a 
reciprocal basis where the economic conditions do not allow for a competitive 
network to be rolled-out.19  
•  In case of mandated access, risk-sharing should be allowed between investors 
and access-seekers. In particular, this can be achieved by either long-
term contracts with minimum quantities – which allows for risk-
sharing20 – or risk-free short-term contracts with a risk premium – the 
investment risk remaining solely with the investor.21 At the same 
time, pricing flexibility should be allowed in retail markets, i.e. 
allowing low retail prices during the penetration phase. 
This proposal would not entail a permanent modification to the access 
regime. On the contrary, the four incumbent players that agreed on the 
proposal clarify that once the investment has been completed and 
penetration levels have reached a threshold, the regulatory regime would 
go ‘back to normal’.  
 
KEY MESSAGE 2 
•  The CEPS Task Force considers that the Commission proposal 
provides insufficient guidance to NRAs and industry players on 
how regulation will apply to Next Generation Access Networks.  
•  Clarification of what regulatory remedies will apply (if any), and 
under what conditions, is essential for encouraging investment in 
these valuable new networks.  
•  Guidance on regulatory tools (e.g. the future of the investment 
ladder) is missing in the current proposal.  
                                                      
19 The areas where the present obligation applies would have to be identified by 
NRAs through an assessment of whether network competition is likely to emerge 
in the area under scrutiny in the medium- to long-term. 
20 The risk-sharing contract will be available for a limited period only, i.e. while 
risk-sharing is still relevant. 
21 The risk premium in the latter contract is reduced as penetration increases. 16 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
•  Market analysis should follow a geographical approach to better 
promote infrastructure investment. 
•  Regulation of NGANs should focus on the deployment of basic 
infrastructures like ducts and masts in order to facilitate market 
entry and network roll-outs by third parties.   
•  Where network competition is found to be economically not 
feasible in the medium- to long-term, access to NGANs should be 
mandated, at the same time ensuring that both investors and access-
seekers share the investment risk.  
 
2.3  Functional separation 
The CEPS Task Force discussed extensively the inclusion of functional 
separation in the set of remedies listed in the Access Directive (proposed 
new Arts 13a and 13b). The main findings of our discussion are 
summarised below. 
•  Functional separation as a remedy was already possible under Art. 8(3) of 
the Access Directive. Its explicit inclusion as an additional remedy 
was therefore not necessary, unless the Commission wanted to 
clarify the exceptional nature of the remedy and the precise steps 
that must be followed to implement it at national level.  
•  Depending on market conditions, functional separation can thus prove a 
useful remedy or a quite disproportionate and harmful solution, as 
testified by the ongoing debate in some member states – with 
Sweden and Italy considering such remedy, whereas in the 
Netherlands the existence of significant infrastructure competition 
led the NRA to reject such remedy as unduly intrusive. In France, 
ARCEP recently warned against the difficulty of implementing 
functional separation.22 Finally, in Germany the idea of mandatory 
functional separation was explicitly rejected. 
o  The only available experience on functional separation in Europe is 
the UK, which led to a remarkable increase in ULL in the past 
                                                      
22 See La Lettre de l’Autorité de Réglementation des Communications Électroniques et 
des Postes,  n. 55, March/April 2007. ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 17 
 
months, and is generally seen with favour, in particular by the 
incumbent player and the NRA. But some commentators have 
also reported some problems in the Quality of Service23 and 
excessively costly implementation.24 
o  However, countries that have not experienced separation also 
exhibited a remarkable increase in ULL through mandatory network 
sharing. This is the example of Germany and France.25  
•  The potential advantages of functional separation are mostly rooted 
in the problem of non-price discrimination, as confirmed by the 
wording of the proposed new Art. 13a of the Access Directive. 
Other advantages mentioned by members of the Task Force 
include: 
o  Regulatory certainty. Competitors know that they will receive 
the same level of service as the incumbent's downstream 
operations; this may provide certainty for future investment 
decisions. 
o  Focus and withdrawal of regulation. By focusing on the key 
bottleneck, the regulator can look to withdraw regulation 
more speedily in other areas (in the UK, sub-national 
deregulation of wholesale broadband access is now being 
considered). 
o  Benefit to consumers. The boost to competitors may ultimately 
translate into improved choice for consumers generally 
(Ofcom). 
•  Potential risks and shortcomings of functional separation identified 
by participants in the Task Force include: 
                                                      
23 A. Gavosto (Telecom Italia), presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task 
Force.  
24 Ibid.,  stating that setting up Openreach cost €70 million in 2006, plus €30 
million in 2007.  
25 Other countries where functional separation has not been implemented 
experience a broadband penetration rate above the European average (18.2%). 
According to the COCOM report reflecting the situation as of July 2007, this is 
the case of Austria, Estonia, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Denmark. 18 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
o  Functional/structural separation as a remedy in other network 
industries has had a very mixed track record. Most of the 
objectives initially set out were not met, whereas adverse 
impacts emerged as regards infrastructure investment, 
regulation and quality of service.26  
o  In telecoms, separation as a remedy bears an even bigger risk of 
altering the fast-changing dynamics of this industry and further 
contributing to its unprecedented uncertainty, at a time when 
Europe is at the crossroads of the massive deployment of fibre 
access networks.27 
o  Functional separation can create an everlasting monopoly, whereas 
e-communications markets are normally converging towards 
a structured oligopoly.28 The transitional nature of sector-
specific regulation in the e-communications sector would thus 
be hampered by such a structural remedy.  
o  Functional separation can jeopardise the emergence of integrated 
multi-play offers, thus hindering the development of welfare-
enhancing business models.29 As an alternative to separation, 
effective equivalent access to the upstream resource of the 
integrated operator can be achieved based on: i) replicability 
measures, ii) operational/quality of service regulation and iii) 
efficient economic regulation, all under the supervision of an 
efficient competition authority.30 
                                                      
26 See J. Salanave (IDATE), presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task 
Force. 
27 Ibid. See also Salanave & Girieud (2008), who state that “the risk/reward ratio 
of mandated functional separation remains particularly unfavourable for the 
telecoms industry at a time of unprecedented transition”.  
28 See presentation by A. Gavosto and V. Hennes. It was objected that if 
separation applies – as it should – to the point of the network that constitutes an 
enduring bottleneck, then it does not create a monopoly. Rather, it deals with one 
that already exists.  
29 It was argued, however, that separation and equivalence merely mean that all 
service providers purchase the same local access input on the same terms, price, 
etc.; thus, it should have no bearing on the ability of the service provider to 
bundle services. 
30 See V. Hennes’ presentation at the third meeting of the CEPS Task Force.  ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 19 
 
o  Functional separation is hardly suited for those countries that do 
not have a real legacy fixed-line infrastructure, as it may 
ultimately hamper facilities-based competition and hinder 
legal certainty. This is particularly important in Central and 
East European countries, where fixed-line penetration is often 
very limited (e.g.  27% in the Czech Republic,  19% in 
Romania).31  
o  While the Commission advocates convergence in national markets, 
implementing functional separation in some countries can lead to 
greater fragmentation, as potential entrants in some national 
markets would find very different entry conditions 
depending on whether the NRA has decided to separate the 
infrastructure or not. 
•  In summary, the CEPS Task Force did not question the potential 
usefulness of functional separation in those countries where market 
conditions suggest the (voluntary) adoption of this remedy (e.g. the 
UK). At the same time, however, the CEPS Task Force suggests that 
the exceptional nature of the remedy should be more strongly 
stated; a clarification of the wording of Art. 13a would thus be 
needed. The text of the article should state that the NRA has to: i) 
convincingly prove that reiterated attempts to apply less intrusive 
remedies have failed, and there are no prospects that they would 
succeed in the future, ii) demonstrate that implementation failure cannot 
be attributed to the NRAs’ own responsibility and iii) provide the 
Commission with an extensive impact assessment, which includes the 
short- and long-term impact of the proposal on the incumbent, 
other operators and consumers, and also quantifies the expected 
impact on investment and innovation in the market affected. The 
impact assessment, in line with best practices in the use of better 
regulation tools, should provide quantification of impacts also for 
alternative (less intrusive) policy options, and should be 
communicated to the Commission for review.  
 
 
                                                      
31 See presentation by Romtelecom to the CEPS Task Force, 9 April 2008. 20 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
KEY MESSAGE 3 
•  The CEPS Task Force considers that the Commission proposal to 
include functional separation in Art. 13a of the Access Directive is 
not useful, unless the main reason for such inclusion is the 
exceptional nature of the provision, which warrants more stringent 
conditions and a higher burden of proof on the NRA. Otherwise, 
such remedy was already covered by Art. 8(3) of the same 
Directive.  
•  Functional separation is no panacea: it might prove useful in some 
national markets, but quite disproportionate in others. The 
Commission (and the EECMA) should therefore avoid sacrificing 
economic efficiency to achieve more consistent regulatory remedies 
in Europe – i.e. mandating separation in many national markets.   
 
2.4  Spectrum policy 
The CEPS Task Force dedicated a full-day meeting to spectrum policy 
issues, some of which are relevant to the review of the 2002 regulatory 
framework. The main issues are related to the digital dividend and to 
technology and service neutrality. Given the differentiated nature of Task 
Force participants, which ensures that all views are represented, the 
debate did not lead to a single solution on how to allocate spectrum that 
will be freed by the analogue switchoff. The participants expressed 
various opinions, which are summarised in this section. 
•  Broadcasters need spectrum to update their technology – e.g.  migrate 
from MPEG2 to MPEG4, which will enable a number of advanced 
services and better compression. They also face significant demand 
for more programme channels and for the launch of High 
Definition TV (HDTV). All this should be taken into account when 
allocating the digital dividend.  
•  At the same time, the currently available spectrum to mobile  is not 
sufficient, in light of the expected growth of mobile voice and high-
speed data traffic in the next few years. Allocating part of the UHF 
band to mobile applications would have the advantage of 
contributing to bridging the digital divide, especially as the IMT-
2000 family of technologies now includes also WiMAX, after the ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 21 
 
WRC-07. One participant estimated that there would be a need for 
about 1280-1720 MHz (including already used by IMT-2000) by 
years 2015-2020.32 These include: 
o  698–862 MHz for coverage and capacity, particularly in 
remote areas and for deep indoor coverage; 
o  2300–2400 MHz for advanced applications; and 
o  3400–3800 MHz for the very advanced applications: longer-
term additional parts of the range 3800–4200 MHz will be 
needed. 
•  There is a clear need to open up the digital dividend to mobile multimedia 
services and wireless broadband access technologies, which can 
bridge the digital divide due to extensive coverage potential. A 
study presented at the Task Force estimated that the contribution to 
productivity and GDP from investment in telecoms and especially 
mobile is greater under the ‘mobile allocation’ than under the ‘TV 
allocation’ scenario, with an added value of 0.6% to GDP growth, 
millions of additional jobs and GDP/head increases over 20% by 
2020.33  
•  More generally, the CEPS Task Force considers market-based mechanisms 
and non-exclusive allocation of spectrum to be essential for Europe. More 
precise guidance should be given to NRAs on how to design 
auctions for the release of spectrum, and technology/service 
neutrality should be carefully implemented. The GE-06 agreement 
for frequency use between 470 and 862 MHz does not need 
significant revision, but mobile services will be given a co-primary 
status in the sub-band 790-862 MHz in Europe. In this respect, the 
results of the WRC-07 (with 2 global and 1 regional band opened to 
IMT technologies in the UHF band) are to be seen with favour.34 
                                                      
32 See presentation by Erik Ekudden (Ericsson), at the second meeting of the 
CEPS Task Force, quoting Report ITU-R M.2078. 
33 Presentation by E. Bohlin, C. Blackman, and S. Forge, CEPS Task Force second 
meeting. The study concluded that an allocation of a substantial part of the 
digital dividend to mobile broadcast services would also help bridge the digital 
divide.  
34 See Chris Woolford (Ofcom), presentation at the second meeting of the CEPS 
Task Force. 22 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
•  The Commission should provide clearer guidance for use of licence-exempt 
spectrum in the 300Mhz-1GHz bands on a non-interference basis. After 
the switchover, many ‘white spaces’ will be available for low-power 
technologies, which can bring new services such as ‘Super-WiFi’.35 
Neighbourhood meshes are one option to be further considered and 
tested at national and EU level. However, compatibility between 
such new services and existing services will have to be further 
studied and demonstrated. 
 
KEY MESSAGE 4 
•  Spectrum in the ‘digital dividend’ bands should be allocated on a 
non-exclusive basis, subject to non-interference conditions.  
•  Broadcasters’ needs as regards technological improvements – e.g. 
migrating from MPEG 2 to MPEG 4 – and demand for new services, 
increased capacity and HDTV should be duly taken into account. 
•  Mobile multimedia services and BWA should be allocated sufficient 
spectrum: however, no radical change in the GE-06 is needed, 
especially after the WRC-07. 
•  License-exempt spectrum usage should be promoted on a non-
interference basis. 
 
2.5  Institutional and governance issues 
Institutional and governance issues lie at the core of the Commission 
proposal for the review of the 2002 regulatory framework. The proposed 
creation of a European e-communications authority or body (EECMA or 
BERT), the extension of the Commission’s veto power to remedies 
proposed by the NRAs and the independence of national regulators have 
been subject to a hectic debate in the past months, and the TF participants 
agreed that these novelties should be analysed jointly, not separately, and 
also in conjunction with other features introduced by the Commission in 
                                                      
35 See J. Beveridge (Microsoft), presentation at the second meeting of the CEPS 
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the proposal, such as functional separation as an additional and 
exceptional remedy.  
Below, the main findings of the Task Force are summarised. Section 
2.5.1 deals with the proposed European Authority or enhanced ERG, 
whereas section 2.5.2 deals with the extension of the Commission’s veto 
power.  
2.5.1  The creation of a new European e-communications authority  
The proposal adopted by the Commission in November 2007 entails the 
creation of a European Electronic Communications Markets Authority 
(EECMA). In the Commission’s view, the EECMA should replace the 
ERG, the ENISA and – partly – the COCOM. Its main functions would be 
that to advise the Commission on market analyses (Phase II); intervene 
whenever an NRA is not complying with a veto decision under Art. 7 of 
the Framework Directive; deal with the analysis of transnational markets 
and pan-European services (including spectrum and ETNS 3883 services); 
and provide network security. The main reason why the Commission 
decided to propose the creation of the EECMA was the need to secure 
sufficient convergence in the regulatory practices at national level. 
However, some of the Task Force participants questioned whether the 
creation of such a new body was really needed. In addition, the Task 
Force agreed that some of the features of the EECMA and its institutional 
positioning within the architecture of the framework need further 
clarification.  
2.5.1.1  The case for EECMA 
The case for the EECMA exists as regards the following arguments: 
•  Internalisation of cross-country externalities, especially as regards 
certain services that overcome national borders (e.g. international 
roaming, mobile communications on board aircrafts, VoIP, 
spectrum, the provision of pan-European services to multi-location 
businesses); and  
•  Ensuring economies of scale in regulatory decisions. 
•  In addition, the ERG has proven to be weak and lacking in accountability, 
although CEPS Task Force participants acknowledged that the ERG 
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regulatory practices (but not deregulatory ones: bitstream, WLR, 
naked DSL, SMS).  
On the other hand, the main arguments against the EECMA are the 
following: 
•  No transition towards ex post competition policy. The creation of the 
EECMA is hardly in line with the transient nature of sector-specific 
regulation.  
•  No justification based on market facts. Markets are not sufficiently 
integrated. As was stated by the Commission in the June 2006 
Impact Assessment, “Until Europe had truly pan-European 
electronic services, it is unlikely that a pan-European regulator will 
be justified”. Such a change in the Commission’s approach does not 
seem to be supported by market facts. 
•  Increased administrative burdens. The EECMA adds another 
administrative layer, costly today and difficult to dismantle in the 
future. This, to some extent, can limit the simplification effort 
sought by the Commission in reducing the list of relevant markets.  
•  Governance does not guarantee independence. In particular, the EECMA 
Administrative Board will be formed by 12 members, 6 of whom 
will be appointed by the Commission, and 6 by the Council.36 As 
the Administrative Board has very important powers in the 
EECMA (e.g. the appointment of the Director and Chief Network 
Security Officer, adoption of the Authority's annual work 
programme and budget, the approval of the general report on the 
Authority’s activities and the adoption of the financial rules 
applicable to the Authority), such a mixed appointment seems to 
jeopardise its role as independent advisor to the Commission, and 
overall independence from national governments.  
•  Accountability is not guaranteed. There are currently no provisions to 
appeal an EECMA decision, and the binding nature of EECMA 
opinions will have to be seen once the new body starts interacting 
with the Commission. As the Meroni doctrine impedes the creation 
of a new agency with discretionary executive powers, the EECMA 
becomes a hybrid institution – not an agency, nor a real authority – 
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whose decisions are currently not subject to any transparency or 
consultation obligations.37  
•  Simple majority voting can create problems. For example, under article 
7 the Commission has to take “utmost account” of the opinion of 
the EECMA when deciding on remedies. This can lead to a situation 
in which an NRA wishing to impose a certain remedy could be 
challenged by a simple majority of other countries, with no 
significant possibility of appealing the Commission decision.38  
•  The EECMA may impede regulatory competition and discovery by 
experimentation.  If the EECMA de facto mandates convergence in 
regulatory approaches, regulatory competition and ‘races to the top’ 
may be hampered by a “centralised approach to a highly 
fragmented market”. In this respect, the EECMA seems to be a 
solution in search of a problem: if in 2010-11 – when the 
Commission proposal is expected to take effect – national markets 
will have converged significantly, then the EECMA may be a useful 
additional layer to ensure that firms engaging in cross-border 
operations find similar conditions in member states. At the same 
time, by that date the market may well be in need of less regulation, 
not more.  
•  The consolidation of competences from the former ERG and the ENISA is 
not justified, as the two bodies require different skills and 
competencies. In addition, the same authority would be given a 
                                                      
37 In Meroni, the ECJ however held the delegation of ‘discretionary power’ as 
unlawful. According to the ECJ: “The consequences resulting from a delegation 
of powers are very different depending on whether it involves clearly defined 
executive powers the exercise of which can therefore, be subject to strict review 
in the light of objective criteria detemined by the delegating authority, or 
whether it involves a discretionary power implying a wide margin of discretion 
which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution 
of actual economic policy.” 
38 For example, the Commission may veto a remedy chosen by an NRA as 
insufficient, de facto  forcing it to resort to functional separation. This would 
occur with the backing of a simple majority vote by the EECMA. The result 
would be that functional separation is imposed in one member state against the 
will of the regulator and the regulated, and with no reasonable possibility to 
appeal the Commission decision.  26 | MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2007-08 TASK FORCE 
 
plethora of powers of a different nature, from a mere advisory role 
(for e-communication markets) to binding powers (for network 
security).  
In summary, the provisions at hand do not clarify what will be the 
balance of power between the Commission (INFSO and COMP) and 
EECMA; and the case for appointing such a new body appears weak at 
best.  
2.5.1.2  From EECMA to BERT: Preliminary remarks 
The proposed new EECMA has been the subject of heated debate in the 
European Parliament during the first months of 2008, especially in the 
ITRE Committee. This debate ultimately led to the development of an 
alternative proposal, which would certainly solve some of the problems 
identified above. As explained by MEP Pilar del Castillo during the last 
Task Force meeting, the EP may consider, as an alternative to the 
EECMA, the creation of an enhanced, institutionalised ERG (or ‘ERG plus 
plus plus’), legally based as an EU body and renamed as Body of 
European Regulators in Telecoms (BERT). The BERT would be composed 
mostly of representatives of NRAs, but with a General Manager (or 
Director) and a resident staff of 10-15. It would be independent and 
accountable to the European Parliament, and would vote with a 2/3 
majority. The BERT would play a purely advisory role to the European 
Commission, which could refer to the new body within the Art. 7 
procedure; but would play a guidance role for NRAs, similar to (and 
possibly stronger than) that performed so far by the ERG. In addition, 
BERT would have an enhanced responsibility for spectrum policy and 
pan-European services. Finally, it is still unclear whether the BERT will 
host an arbitration panel, aimed at solving controversies that may emerge 
in the implementation of the Art. 7 procedure, especially if the 
Commission’s veto power is extended to remedies identified by NRAs 
(see below, section 2.5.2).  
The proposal to create the BERT is still being finalised by the EP 
Rapporteur; accordingly, the CEPS Task Force can only offer some 
general remarks on the pros and cons of undertaking such an initiative. In 
particular:  
•  The BERT appears as a more sustainable solution than the EECMA, and 
poses less problems as regards the need to secure that sectoral ex ante 
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•  Compared to the EECMA, the BERT would not solve the problem of red 
tape, especially if the Commission is obliged to refer to it all 
decisions taken ex-Art. 7. Of course, the additional administrative 
layer would be less burdensome if such a referral is not mandatory, 
but only optional.   
•  For what concerns the role played by the BERT, the potential for this 
body to contribute to the achievement of the internal market for e-
communication services would have to be tested in practice, and would 
mostly depend on the extent to which the new body would 
intervene to ensure that NRAs treat analogous regulatory issues 
consistently, at the same time refraining from the adoption of ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approaches.  
•  Just like the EECMA, also the BERT – unless the final proposal will 
propose the creation of an arbitration panel within the new body – would 
not solve the problem of appeals to the Commission’s decisions, which 
is likely to become even more urgent if the veto Commission’s veto 
power ex-Art. 7  is extended to remedies (again, see section 2.5.2 
below).  
Table 2 below summarises the main differences between the 
EECMA and the BERT, as they stand today. 
In summary, the CEPS Task Force considers that the proposed 
BERT would share the potential benefits of EECMA as regards the need 
for more coordination of policy at EU level, and especially as regards the 
partial coordination of spectrum policy and the promotion of pan-
European services. At the same time, BERT would create fewer problems 
as regards the transition towards competition policy, budgetary 
allocation, balance of powers, voting procedures, the consolidation with 
ENISA and (potentially) appeals to Commission decisions. Finally, BERT 
would still entail additional red tape, and its transparency and 
independence features still have to be fully defined. To be sure, such a 
body would represent the ‘missing piece’ in the framework puzzle only if 
it provides a sustainable and effective forum for appeals to Commission 
decisions under Art. 7. This would be even more important if the veto 
power of the Commission is eventually extended also to remedies 
imposed by NRAs.  
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Table 2. EECMA vs. BERT 
Issue EECMA BERT 
Transition 
towards ex post 
competition 
policy 
Very difficult: EECMA would be 
very difficult to dismantle, and 
would have scant incentives to 
enable the full transition. Staff is 
estimated at 134. 
Easier: BERT is mostly 
composed of representatives of 
NRAs, plus limited in-house 
staff (10-15). 
Market 
integration 
The idea of a new regulator was 
rejected by the EC in June 2006 
as markets were not sufficiently 
integrated: things have only 
marginally changed since then. 
BERT could continue the 
activity of the ERG with 
stronger legal basis. Whereas 
market integration would be a 
precondition for EECMA, it 
could be a mission for BERT. 
Administrative 
burdens 
EECMA adds red tape during 
Art. 7 procedures, although 
simple majority voting can speed 
up its internal procedures. 
BERT does not solve the problem 
of red tape, and qualified 
majority could increase the time 
needed for an opinion. If EC 
referral is optional, the burden 
may be limited. 
Independence  EECMA’s administrative board 
does not ensure independence. 
Depends on who appoints the 
Director. It is dependent on 
NRAs, but potentially 
independent from the 
Commission. 
Accountability  To the European Parliament  To the European Parliament 
Transparency  No provision on transparency  To be addressed 
Voting rules  Simple majority  2/3 majority 
Consolidation 
with ENISA 
Yes, although the synergies are 
very limited. 
No, ENISA would remain a 
stand-alone agency. 
Spectrum  Enhanced responsibility for pan-
European services. Would have 
to be coordinated with other 
bodies such as RSPG and RSC. 
Mandate to identify actions 
needed for pan-European 
services. Would have to be 
coordinated with other bodies 
such as RSPG and RSC. 
Appeals to EC 
decisions 
Not solved  The issue would be tackled only 
if an arbitration panel or an 
analogous procedure is created 
within BERT. 
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2.5.2  The extension of the Commission’s veto power 
•  The Commission’s proposal extends the scope of the Art. 7 review 
to remedies proposed by NRAs after a market analysis. Opinions in 
the CEPS Task Force were not unanimous in this respect, with some 
participants rejecting the proposal as inefficient (as NRAs know 
best the conditions of their domestic market), and others 
considering it to be a better safeguard against mistaken NRA 
decisions than the scrutiny by national (administrative) courts, 
often badly equipped to deal with complex problems of sectoral 
regulation.  
•  The Task Force reiterates its recommendation to enhance the status of 
the three-criteria test and include it (in a clarified version) in the text 
of the Framework Directive.  
•  The standards of the review and the role of the Commission should be 
clarified: Is the review of remedies just an ‘internal market check’, or 
a full EU appeal? 
•  A more precise definition should be given as regards what 
constitutes “affecting trade between Member States”.39 
2.5.3  Checks and balances 
•  A key feature of complex, multi-level regulatory frameworks is the 
system of checks and balances. In this respect, the CEPS Task Force 
has identified a number of problems related both to the 2002 
framework and the currently proposed review. These problems add 
to the ones identified in the previous sections on the EECMA or 
BERT (2.5.1) and on veto power over remedies (2.5.2). 
o  First, the objective of the framework is not clearly stated: 
Stimulate broadband as in i2010 Action Plan (industrial 
policy) or just ensure markets are functioning properly (neo-
classical model)? The real objective should be linked to long-
term consumer welfare, including dynamic efficiency 
(innovation, incentives to invest in R&D) and a wide 
availability of advanced products and services at reasonable 
cost.  
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o  Secondly, the incentives for NRAs are inefficient. This is due to 
the incomplete, ‘hybrid’ application of competition policy 
tools and the low burden of proof for regulating markets 
included in the 2003 recommendation.  
o  Thirdly, the approach to centralisation and regulatory convergence 
appears unsatisfactory. On the one hand, NRAs’ defence of 
national interests prevents the full achievement of the benefits 
of centralisation (account of countries externalities); on the 
other hand, insufficient accountability and unclear mandates 
in the Commission and ERG (later EECMA or BERT) control 
prevent the achievement of the benefits of decentralisation.  
o  Fourthly,  the problem of appeals is only mildly tackled in the 
Commission proposal, which hints at a future Commission 
initiative that will arguable clarify the criteria to be applied 
for suspending the effects of a NRA decision under appeal. In 
addition, the proposal mandates reporting on subjects, 
number and duration of appeals as well as suspension. 
o  Fifthly,  participation of affected undertaking is not considered 
when questioning NRAs’ measures (EC phase two decisions). 
Whatever institutional setting is adopted, a mandatory 
hearing of the affected operators before the Commission and – 
depending on the weight of its opinion – a future authority or 
body of regulators, must be introduced.  
o  Finally,  training of NRAs is needed – more than centralised 
regulatory bodies – to ensure the correct implementation of 
the regulatory tools provided by the current framework. The 
independence and accountability of NRAs is dependent on: i) 
a more dynamic view of the market, ii) regular reporting on 
dynamic indicators (e.g. Ofcom) and iii) external evaluation, 
on the basis of NRA management plans (e.g. OPTA). 
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KEY MESSAGE 5 
•  The CEPS Task Force believes that there might be a case for more 
centralisation with a European authority, but limited to specific 
issues where the EECMA may internalise cross-countries 
externalities and/or achieve economies of scale in regulatory 
decisions. In general, the CEPS Task Force is rather sceptical 
towards the creation of a new European authority, which would 
imply more bureaucracy instead of less. 
•  In addition, current governance features of the EECMA and lack of 
accountability and transparency measures call for a significant 
revision of the Commission proposal as it stands today. 
•  Compared to the EECMA, the proposed BERT would exhibit 
similar potential benefits; at the same time, the BERT would create 
fewer problems as regards the transition towards competition 
policy, budgetary allocation, balance of powers, voting procedures, 
the consolidation with ENISA and (potentially) appeals to 
Commission decisions.  
•  BERT would still entail additional red tape, and its transparency 
and independence features still have to be fully defined.  
•  The BERT would represent the ‘missing piece’ in the framework 
puzzle only if it provides a sustainable and effective forum for 
appeals to Commission decisions under Art. 7. This would be even 
more important if the veto power of the Commission is eventually 
extended also to remedies imposed by NRAs. 
•  The Task Force reiterates its recommendation to enhance the status 
of the three-criteria test and include it (in a clarified version) in the 
text of the Framework Directive. The standards of the review and 
the role of the Commission should be clarified. 
•  Several changes are needed in the current system of checks and 
balances, including the incentives for NRAs, the accountability of 
the institutions involved (including the EECMA or the BERT), the 
need to consult affected stakeholders on phase 2 decisions and the 
possibility of appealing Commission decisions, especially if taken 
with the support of an EECMA simple majority vote. In this respect, 
a BERT with an embedded arbitration panel would represent a step 
forward in the direction of both better regulation and sustainable 
consolidation of the internal market.  
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3.  COUNTRY CASE STUDIES:  
ROMANIA AND TURKEY 
uring the final meeting of the CEPS Task Force on “Achieving the 
Internal Market for e-communications”, two country case studies 
were presented and discussed. The countries covered are a new 
member state (Romania) and a large market that currently does not 
belong to the EU27 (Turkey), but that has chosen to design its regulatory 
framework for e-communications on the basis of the European regulatory 
framework. The situation in the two countries was presented by 
important industry players such as Romtelecom and Turkcell. Below, we 
report the highlights of the two case studies.  
3.1  Romania 
The case of Romania is enlightening, especially for what concerns the 
functioning of the 2002 regulatory framework in a new member state.40 
With a population of 22 million and 7.5 million households, Romania is 
the seventh largest nation in the EU. Around 47% of its inhabitants live in 
rural areas, whereas in the EU over 70% of the total population live in 
urban areas. Compared with the EU average, Romanian income levels are 
low, both in absolute and relative terms; in addition, income distribution 
is highly skewed towards the upper-income earners and towards the 
large cities, so that the highest 20% of earners in Romania account for 
over 40% of total income. These peculiar features explain, at least partly, 
                                                      
40 The CEPS Task Force did not deal directly with spectrum policy in Romania. 
For a case study, see Bohlin et al. (2008).  
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why Romania is still lagging behind in terms of ICT uptake, with PC 
penetration still being relatively low.41  
In the telecoms sector, Romania exhibits the following peculiarities: 
•  Low and declining fixed line penetration, with almost no legacy 
network. Currently Romania has a fixed penetration of 19% of the 
population and 56% of households. This is very low by EU 
standards, and similar to the situation in other CEE countries (such 
as e.g. the Czech Republic).  
•  Infrastructure-based competition in the fixed markets, especially in urban 
areas. This is mostly due to:  
o  High and increasing mobile penetration: with 22.8 million mobile 
subscribers, the dominant service platform for voice is mobile. 
There is also significant fixed-mobile substitution: mobile 
originating traffic exceeds fixed originating traffic by over 
50% and this ratio is increasing very rapidly. 
o  High cable TV availability, with penetration of analogue cable 
networks almost matching that of PSTN. This has ultimately 
led to fierce price competition, with Romtelecom introducing 
its unlimited on-net offers (full on-net unlimited for 
€11.2/month) and RDS offering a stand-alone fixed telephony 
plan for €0 with minutes included (100 on-net minutes and 50 
minutes for calls to Romtelecom); and a high churn rate, 
which ultimately indicates a lack of dominance for wireline 
operators even in access markets. 
                                                      
41 Around 29% of households have access to a minimum of one PC, which 
compares with around 54% in the European Union. 34 | COUNTRY CASE STUDIES: ROMANIA AND TURKEY 
 
Figure 2. Usage and Churn in Romania, 2005-07 
 
 
•  Low broadband penetration. Notwithstanding vibrant infrastructure-
based competition between PSTN and cable, Romanian broadband 
penetration is still around 10% of total population, substantially 
below the average of 20% in the EU27. Romtelecom is practically a 
new entrant on the broadband market, reaching a market share of 
17% by January 2008. This is a unique case in EU, since at the end of 
January 2008 over 80% of broadband was provided using a non-
DSL technology.  Infrastructure competition has led prices for 
broadband to decrease rapidly during the last year: 1Mbps 
subscription is now offered by Romtelecom (ADSL) for €7.5/month 
and by RDS (cable) for €5.69/month. 
Figure 3. Key figures and statistics for communications in Romania, 2005-07 
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The case study on Romania suggests the following conclusions: 
•  No one size fits all approach. National markets – especially new EU 
member states – face specific challenges that need a tailored 
approach, mostly aimed at encouraging investment in broadband 
infrastructure.  
•  Standard regulatory measures (focused on the development of competition) 
already implemented have proven incapable of stimulating investments in 
the fixed infrastructure and bridging the development gap between 
Romania and the rest of the EU. 
•  Regional differences and limited availability of a fixed network call 
for regulation at the sub-national level. 
•  In some European countries, most notably in new member states, 
the infrastructure of legacy fixed-lines is not as present as in old 
member states. This has led mobile telephony to quickly become a 
substitute for fixed-line telephony – a situation that can hardly be 
tackled with the current fragmentation of relevant markets in the 
2003 and 2007 Recommendations.   
•  As regards the issue of functional separation, it is quite clear that such 
a remedy would hardly be suitable in countries with underdeveloped 
infrastructures like Romania. 
Based on these findings, Romtelecom proposes the amendment of 
the Framework Directive in order to allow the implementation of an 
adequate industrial policy aimed to stimulate the growth of the telecoms 
sector and close the development gap between Romania and the EU. Such 
an amendment should allow NRAs in countries with underdeveloped 
fixed infrastructure and low coverage for fixed and broadband services, 
to consider giving priority to the promotion of investments over pure 
competition-stimulation objectives. 
3.2  Turkey 
The Turkish market offers large opportunities for growth and investment. 
Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005, and is 
preparing itself for full integration with the EU. However, as also recently 
highlighted by recent academic papers,42 even if Turkey adopted a 
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regulatory regime that is broadly in line with the EU framework, primary 
legislation is still more in line with the 1998 framework (the so-called 
‘Open Network Provisions’) than with the subsequent, far-reaching 
regulatory framework. As remarked by the European Commission in its 
2006 progress report, in many areas “Turkey has not adopted new 
legislation that would align it with the 2002 framework”. Even more 
importantly, the implementation of the current framework appears 
affected by a number of governance problems and undue political 
influence, worsened by the persisting government stake in the fixed 
incumbent Turk Telecom and its mobile subsidiary Avea.  
As of today, Turkey certainly represents one of the most important 
emerging telecommunications markets: with a population of 
approximately 70 million, the lowest per capita GDP in OECD countries, 
a 27% penetration rate of fixed-line telephony (in terms of population), 
88% penetration of 2G mobile at the end of 2007 and very low broadband 
penetration, it is fair to state that the potential for vibrant developments 
in this country is remarkable. The acquisition of mobile operator Telsim 
by Vodafone at the end of 2005 testifies to the attractiveness, as well as 
the growth potential, of the Turkish market for foreign, global operators. 
The absence of adequate competitive safeguards and a poor 
investment climate have been considered as the major causes of the 
currently inadequate broadband uptake in Turkey. Turkey, with a 5.2% 
broadband penetration rate, lags behind most OECD countries.43 In 
addition, Turkey exhibits also the lowest subscription rate, i.e. even if 
broadband covered the whole territory, broadband subscriptions would 
not exceed 21.8%, according to recent calculations.44 Furthermore, 
Turkey’s broadband infrastructure is entirely dependent on DSL 
technology with almost no endowment of cable, fibre/LAN and other 
technologies, including 3G. Accordingly, Turkey hardly compares to the 
OECD average penetration rate. 
Three major issues related to the current regulatory framework in 
Turkey are described below. 
•  Need to withdraw the regulation of mobile retail tariffs. The Turkish 
Telecommunications Authority (TA) passed a resolution on 25 
                                                      
43 See the Commission’s 13th implementation report,  p. 28.  
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September 2007, setting a floor on the leading mobile operator on-
net calls. The TA stated that Turkcell should adjust its retail prices, 
which are lower than its call termination prices charged to the other 
operators. In this respect, it must be considered that intervening in 
mobile retail markets is unusual in current regulatory practices. For 
example, three member states (Slovenia, Belgium and Portugal) 
previously proposed  to impose retail price controls in mobile 
markets, but the proposals were withdrawn after the negative 
reaction by the European Commission. As a result, today neither 
the Commission nor a single National Regulatory Authority has 
intervened to regulate mobile retail tariffs. 
•  Need to lift the tax burden on mobile communications. The first CEPS 
Task Force report (Renda, 2007) already recalled that in Turkey, 
mobile operators are subject to an impressive conundrum of taxes, 
which include a Special Communication Tax, the Treasury Share 
Premium, the Stamp Duty, the TGM Handset License Fee and TGM 
Handset Usage Fee. As a result, Turkey exhibits the highest tax rate 
worldwide, as shown in Figure 5. Such a high tax rate inevitably 
exerts a restrictive effect on penetration. With lower rates, a much 
higher market penetration could have been achieved instead of the 
current 88%, which hardly compares to 112% in the EU. A similar 
concern for high tax rates was expressed by the World Bank (2004) 
in its Turkey Knowledge Economy Assessment Study, in which a key 
recommendation was to “reduce the tax and regulatory burden on 
ICT”. GSMA (2005) published a study on the impact of taxation on 
mobile market growth, highlighting that “the degree to which 
taxation acts as a barrier for users, preventing potentially hundreds 
of millions people from affording mobile communications and 
holding back economic growth and social development in many 
countries”, and showing the magnitude of the Turkish ‘anomaly’. 
Similar conclusions were reported by Deloitte’s Global Mobile Tax 
Review 2006-2007, and are reported below in Figure 5. Mobile 
value-added services (VAS), such as purchasing musical contents 
over mobile handsets, are still struggling due to the high tax 
burden. Importantly, the tax burden has the worst effect on low-
user groups, since fixed taxes have a higher weight on the overall 
usage. In this respect, Turkcell advocated the following measures: 
o  fixed taxes should be lifted immediately; 38 | COUNTRY CASE STUDIES: ROMANIA AND TURKEY 
 
o  the special communications tax should be immediately 
decreased to the same level of fixed telephony (15%), and 
eventually lifted altogether; 
o  value-added services should be exempted from any kind of 
tax (apart from VAT); and 
o  one type of standard tax should be implied at average EU 
level. 
Figure 4. Impact of taxation on mobile users in Turkey 
 
Figure 5. Tax as a share of total cost of mobile ownership (TCMO) 
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•  Delays  in  awarding 3G licenses.  In Turkey there are no 3G/UMTS 
services yet. An auction for four UMTS licenses was set to take 
place in May 2007, but was cancelled. Turkey’s National Regulatory 
Board reportedly stated that the cancellation was due to the fact 
that there was insufficient interest in the tender. On 16 June 2007, 
the Telecommunications Authority announced that four licenses for 
IMT-2000/UMTS services and infrastructures would be awarded 
through auctions to be held on 7 September 2007. Only Turkcell 
participated in this tender and won one license on a bid of €311 
million, plus VAT. The rest of the licenses were not sold. The 3G 
mobile phone license awarded to Turkcell was later cancelled by 
the Telecommunications Authority Board on 21 September 2007. 
The Authority had allegedly decided that the tender process had 
not been sufficiently competitive, and that granting a license to the 
sole operator who submitted the offer could increase the 
competitive advantage of the wining operator at the expense of 
others. There is currently a sector-wide feeling that the delay in 
awarding 3G licenses aims at keeping Türk Telekom’s broadband 
services shielded from competition as long as possible. 
•  New reference interconnection rates. From April 2008, Turkcell’s 
termination rate has been reduced (33%), whereas Türk Telekom’s 
fixed termination rates have slightly been reduced (10%). As a 
result of this decision, an estimated €70 million will be transferred 
from GSM operators to Türk Telekom. Apart from this action, the 
Telecommunications Authority has kept the asymmetry level for 
Avea (operational for 7 years now) at 23%. Figure 7 below shows 
the new levels of termination rates compared to the previous ones.  
Figure 6. Old vs. new termination rates 
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Finally, the Turkish telecoms sector is also affected by a number of 
additional problems, which significantly affect the viability of doing 
business. These problems relate to the following areas: 
•  Fixed telephony services. Only the incumbent Türk Telekom is 
authorised to provide local-call service. Long distance telephony 
service operators are struggling to gain market share. 
•  Broadband internet services. The subsidiary of the incumbent holds 
98% market share. No single local loop has been unbundled yet. So 
far, no alternative carrier has launched the service due to price 
squeeze policy of Türk Telekom. 
•  Leased line markets. No alternative infrastructure provider emerged 
other than the incumbent.  
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4.  SUMMARY  
he CEPS Task Force suggests a number of changes to be introduced 
in the future regulatory framework. Such changes would at once 
ensure continuity for NRAs, regulatory certainty for industry 
players and make the necessary adaptation of the theoretical framework 
to the competitive dynamics of future IP-based networks. Suggestions on 
the review package proposed by the Commission on 13 November 2007 
are summarised below. 
•  Suggestions on the proposed list of relevant markets 
o  The CEPS Task Force agrees with the proposed shortening of 
the list of relevant markets, and acknowledges that the 
Commission proposal mirrors most of the suggestions 
included in the Final Report of the previous Task Force.  
o  However, the expected reduction in the level of regulation is 
uncertain; the lack of clear guidance to NRAs and the lack of 
clear rules on market definition and emerging markets may 
jeopardise the effect of this appreciable initiative.  
o  More guidance and training to NRAs are needed to ensure 
that current regulatory tools are properly applied.  In 
particular, guidance on geographical segmentation and the 
application of the three criteria test are needed to ensure that 
markets evolve towards sustainable competition.  
o  For markets that are currently regulated, but have been 
removed from the list, the NRAs should be obliged to 
perform new market analyses as soon as possible.  
•  Suggestions on addressing the migration to all-IP networks 
o  The CEPS Task Force considers that the Commission proposal 
provides insufficient guidance to NRAs and industry players 
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on how regulation will apply to Next Generation Access 
Networks.  
o  Clarification of what regulatory remedies will apply (if any), 
and under what conditions, is essential for encouraging 
investment in these valuable new networks.  
o  Guidance on regulatory tools (e.g.  the future of the 
investment ladder) is missing in the current proposal.  
o  Regulation of NGANs should focus on the deployment of 
basic infrastructures like ducts and masts in order to facilitate 
market entry and network roll-outs by third parties.   
o  Geographical segmentation can promote NGA infrastructure 
investment, if the local competitive situation is taken duly 
into account, and represents a suitable model to foster gradual 
deregulation. 
o  Where network competition is found to be economically not 
feasible in the medium to long term, access to NGANs should 
be mandated, at the same time ensuring that both investors 
and access-seekers share the investment risk. 
•  Suggestions on functional separation 
o  The CEPS Task Force considers that the Commission proposal 
to include functional separation in Art. 13a of the Access 
Directive is not useful, unless the main reason for such 
inclusion is the exceptional nature of the provision, which 
warrants more stringent conditions and a higher burden of 
proof on the NRA. Otherwise, such remedy was already 
covered by Art. 8(3) of the same Directive.  
o  Functional separation is no panacea: it might prove useful in 
some national markets, but quite disproportionate in others. 
The Commission (and the EECMA) should therefore avoid 
sacrificing economic efficiency to achieve more consistent 
regulatory remedies in Europe – i.e. mandating separation in 
many national markets. 
•  Suggestions on spectrum policy 
o  Spectrum in the ‘digital dividend’ bands should be allocated 
on a non-exclusive basis, subject to non-interference 
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o  Broadcasters’ needs as regards technological improvements – 
e.g. migrating from MPEG 2 to MPEG 4 – and demands for 
new services, increased capacity and HDTV should be duly 
taken into account. 
o  Mobile multimedia services and BWA should be allocated 
sufficient spectrum: however, no radical change in the GE-06 
is needed, especially after the WRC-07. 
o  License-exempt spectrum usage should be promoted on a 
non-interference basis. 
•  Suggestions on institutional and governance issues 
o  The CEPS Task Force believes that there might be a case for 
more centralisation with a European authority, but limited to 
specific issues where the proposed EECMA may internalise 
cross-country externalities and/or achieve economies of scale 
in regulatory decisions. In general, the CEPS Task Force is 
rather sceptical towards the creation of a new European 
authority, which would imply more bureaucracy instead of 
less. 
o  In addition, current governance features of the EECMA and 
lack of accountability and transparency measures call for a 
significant revision of the Commission proposal as it stands 
today. 
o  Compared to the EECMA, the proposed BERT would exhibit 
similar potential benefits; at the same time, the BERT would 
create fewer problems as regards the transition towards 
competition policy, budgetary allocation, balance of powers, 
voting procedures, the consolidation with ENISA and 
(potentially) appeals to Commission decisions.  
o  The BERT would still entail additional red tape, and its 
transparency and independence features still have to be fully 
defined.  
o  The BERT would represent the ‘missing piece’ in the 
framework puzzle only if it provides a sustainable and 
effective forum for appeals to Commission decisions under 
Art. 7. This would be even more important if the veto power 
of the Commission is eventually extended also to remedies 
imposed by NRAs. 44 | SUMMARY 
 
o  The Task Force reiterates its recommendation to enhance the 
status of the three-criteria test and include it (in a clarified 
version) in the text of the Framework Directive. The standards 
of the review and the role of the Commission should be 
clarified. 
o  Several changes are needed in the current system of checks 
and balances, including the incentives for NRAs, the 
accountability of the institutions involved (including the 
EECMA or the BERT), the need to consult affected 
stakeholders on phase 2 decisions, and the possibility of 
appealing Commission decisions, especially if taken with the 
support of an EECMA simple majority vote. In this respect, a 
BERT with an embedded arbitration panel would represent a 
step forward in the direction of both better regulation and 
sustainable consolidation of the internal market.   
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GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS AND 
ACRONYMS 
2G  
Second-generation mobile network or service. Generic name for second 
generation mobile networks, for example GSM. 
2.5G 
Second-generation enhanced. Name given to enhanced 2G networks. 
3G 
Third-generation mobile network or service. Generic name for third-
generation networks or services under the IMT-2000 banner, for example 
W-CDMA. 
Access charge (or access price) 
Amount paid per minute, charged by network operators for the use of 
their network by other network operators. 
All-IP NGN 
All Internet Protocol Next Generation Network. 
Analogue 
Transmission of voice and images using electrical signals.  
ARPU 
Average Revenue Per User. Usually expressed per month but also per year. 
ASP 
Application Service Provider. 
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ATM 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode.  
Bandwidth 
The range of frequencies available to be occupied by signals. In analogue 
systems it is measured in terms of Hertz (Hz) and in digital systems in 
bit/s per second (bit/s). The higher the bandwidth, the greater the 
amount of information that can be transmitted in a given time. High 
bandwidth channels are referred to as broadband which typically means 
1.5/2.0 Mbit/s or higher. 
Bit (binary digit) 
A bit is the primary unit of electronic, digital data. Written in base-2, 
binary language as a “1” or a “0”. 
Bit/s 
Bits per second. Measurement of the transmission speed of units of data 
(bits) over a network. 
BPL 
Broadband over Power Lines.  Technology that allows internet data to be 
transmitted over utility power lines. (BPL is also sometimes called Power-
line Communications or PLC)  
Broadband 
Although there exist various definitions of broadband that have assigned 
a minimum data rate to the term, it may be defined as transmission 
capacity with sufficient bandwidth to permit combined provision of 
voice, data and video, typically at speeds over 2 Mbit/s. 
BWA 
Broadband Wireless Access.  
Byte 
(1) A set of bits that represent a single character. A byte is composed of 8 
bits.  
(2) A bit string that is operated upon as a unit and the size of which is 
independent of redundancy or framing techniques. 
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CDMA 
Code Division Multiple Access. A technology for digital transmission of 
radio signals based on spread spectrum techniques where each voice or 
data call uses the whole radio band and is assigned a unique code. 
Connectivity 
The capability to provide, to end users, connections to the internet or 
other communication networks. 
Coverage 
Refers to the range of a mobile cellular network, measured in terms of 
geographic coverage (the percentage of the territorial area covered by 
mobile cellular) or population coverage (the percentage of the population 
within range of a mobile cellular network). 
Digital 
Representation of voice or other information using digits 0 and 1. The 
digits are transmitted as a series of pulses. Digital networks allow for 
higher capacity, greater functionality and improved quality. Examples of 
digital cellular networks include GSM, CDMA, and TDMA. 
Digital Dividend 
The available UHF spectrum. The cleared, the potentially cleared and the 
interleaved spectrum. 
DRM 
Digital Rights Management. A system of information technology (IT) 
components and services along with corresponding law, policies and 
business models which strive to distribute and control intellectual 
property (IP) and its rights.  
DSL 
Digital subscriber line. See also xDSL. 
e-commerce 
Electronic commerce. Term used to describe transactions that take place on-
line where the buyer and seller are remote from each other. 
End-user 
The individual or organisation that originates or is the final recipient of 
information carried via the internet (i.e. the consumer). ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 53 
 
EoI 
Equivalence of Input. As applied in the UK, it requires that competitors be 
provided with exactly the same set of regulated wholesale products, at 
the same prices and using the same systems and transactional processes, 
as the dominant provider’s own retail activities; and 
F2M 
Fixed to Mobile communication.  
Fixed line 
A physical line connecting the subscriber to the telephone exchange. 
Typically, fixed-line network refers to the PSTN (see below) to 
distinguish it from mobile networks. 
Frequency 
The rate at which an electrical current alternates, usually measured in 
Hertz (see Hz). It is also used to refer to a location on the radio frequency 
spectrum, such as 800, 900 or 1,800 Mhz. 
Fibre Optic Cable 
A transmission medium that uses glass or plastic fibres rather than 
copper wire to transport data or voice signals.  The signal is imposed on 
the fibres via pulses (modulation) of light from a laser or a light-emitting 
diode (LED).  Because of its high bandwidth and lack of susceptibility to 
interference, fibre-optic cable is used in long-haul or noisy applications. 
FTTB+LAN 
Fibre To The Building+LAN. 
FTTH 
Fibre To The Home. The fibre deployment architecture in which optical 
fibre is carried all the way to the customer's home or premise, allowing 
for a high speed broadband connection. 
FTTC 
Fibre To The Curb. The deployment of optical fibre from a telephone 
switch to within 1,000 feet of a home or enterprise. 
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Functional Separation 
Separation of an incumbent operator’s network and service activities in 
distinct autonomously-managed divisions to ensure equivalence of access 
to the last mile infrastructure and treatment for the incumbent's service 
division and third-party service providers. 
GSM 
Global System for Mobile communications. European-developed digital 
mobile cellular standard. It is the most widespread 2G digital mobile 
cellular standard, available in over 170 countries worldwide. 
HDTV 
High Definition Television. 
Hz 
Hertz. The frequency measurement unit equal to one cycle per second. 
IIA 
Integrated Impact Assessment. 
ICT 
Information and Communication Technology. 
ILEC 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier. Refers to a telephone company in the 
United States that was providing local service when the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted. 
IMT-2000 
International Mobile Telecommunications 2000. 
Incumbent 
The (former) monopoly service and network provider in a particular 
country. 
Interconnection 
The physical connection of telecommunication networks owned by two 
different operators. Network operators typically charge a per minute fee 
for use of their network by other operators (referred to as an 
‘interconnection charge’, ‘access charge’ or ‘network usage charge’). ACHIEVING THE INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS| 55 
 
Internet backbone 
The high-speed, high capacity lines or series of connections that form a 
major pathway and carry aggregated traffic within the internet. 
Internet Content Provider 
A person or organisation, that provides information via the internet either 
with a price or free of charge. 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
ISPs provide end-users, and other ISPs, access to the internet. ISPs may 
also offer their own proprietary content and access to online services such 
as e-mail. 
Internet 
The collection of interconnected networks that use the internet protocols 
(IP). 
IP 
Internet Protocol. The dominant network layer protocol used with the 
TCP/IP protocol suite. 
IP telephony 
Internet Protocol Telephony. IP telephony is used as a generic term for the 
conveyance of voice, fax and related services, partially or wholly over 
packet-switched IP-based networks. In this report, IP telephony is used 
interchangeably with voice over internet protocol (see VoIP). A third 
term, internet telephony, is used when referring to IP telephony conveyed 
partially or wholly over the internet. 
IPR 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
Local Area Network (LAN) 
A computer network that spans a relatively small area. Most LANs are 
confined to a single building or group of buildings. However, one LAN 
can be connected to other LANs over any distance via telephone lines and 
radio waves. A system of LANs connected in this way is called a wide-
area network (WAN). 
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Local loop 
The system used to connect the subscriber to the nearest switch. It 
generally consists of a pair of copper wires, but may also employ fibre-
optic or wireless technologies. 
LLU 
Local Loop Unbundling. LLU requires those operators designated as having 
significant market power to make their local networks (i.e. the telephone 
lines that run from a customer's premises to the local telephone exchange) 
available to other telecommunications companies. 
LRIC 
Long-Run Incremental Cost. The costs caused by the provision of a defined 
increment of output, taking a long run perspective, assuming that some 
output is already produced. The 'long run' means the time horizon over 
which all costs (including capital investment) are variable. 
M2M 
Mobile to Mobile communication.  
Modified Greenfield Approach 
A Modified Greenfield Approach in the analysis of relevant markets takes 
account of non-SMP regulation and of SMP-related regulation originating 
in markets which are not a component of the value chain under review. 
MNO 
Mobile Network Operator. 
MPEG2  
The MPEG2 format, a video standard developed by MPEG group, is often 
used in digital TVs, DVD movies and in SVCDs. It is not a successor for 
MPEG1, but an addition instead. Both of these formats have their own 
purposes. MPEG1 is meant for medium-bandwidth usage and MPEG2 is 
meant for high-bandwidth/broadband usage.  
MPEG4 
MPEG4, the latest compression method standardized by MPEG group, is 
used for both streaming and downloadable web content, and is also the 
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recorders. One of the best-known MPEG4 encoders is DivX which since 
version 5 has been fully standard-compliant MPEG4 encoder. 
NGAN 
Next Generation Access Network.  
NGN 
Next Generation Network. A packet-based network able to provide 
Telecommunication Services to users and able to make use of multiple 
broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-
related functions are independent of the underlying transport-related 
technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to 
competing service providers and services of their choice. It supports 
generalised mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous 
provision of services to users. 
Number portability 
The ability of a customer to transfer an account from one service provider 
to another without requiring a change in number. 
OLO 
Other Licensed Operator. Companies, other than the incumbent, which 
operate telecommunications systems. 
Penetration 
A measurement of access to telecommunications, normally calculated by 
dividing the number of subscribers to a particular service by the 
population and multiplying by 100. Also referred to as teledensity (for 
fixed-line networks) or mobile density (for cellular ones). 
PLC 
Powerline Communications. See BPL.  
Protocol 
A set of formal rules and specifications describing how to transmit data, 
especially across a network. 
PSTN 
Public Switched Telephone Network. The public telephone network that 
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PTO 
Public telecommunication operator. A provider of telecommunication 
infrastructure and services to the general public. The term public relates 
to the customer rather than the ownership of the PTO. 
Public pay phone 
Typically supplied and operated by the incumbent carrier, public 
payphones have been a traditional method of encouraging widespread 
access to telecommunication facilities. 
RBOC 
Regional Bell Operating Company. One of the U.S. regional telephone 
companies (or their successors) that were created as a result of the break-
up of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) by a U.S. 
Federal Court consent decree on 31 December 1983. 
Roaming 
A service allowing cellular subscribers to use their handsets on networks 
of other operators or in other countries. 
Server 
(1) A host computer on a network that sends stored information in 
response to requests or queries. 
(2) The term server is also used to refer to the software that makes the 
process of serving information possible. 
SMP 
Significant Market Power.  According to  Art. 14(2) of the Framework 
Directive, “an undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market 
power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position 
equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers”.  
Spectrum 
The radio frequency spectrum of hertzian waves used as a transmission 
medium for cellular radio, radio-paging, satellite communication, over-
the-air broadcasting and other services. 
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SSNIP 
Small Significant Non Transitory Increase in Price. The SSNIP test is 
commonly used by competition authorities in the market definition 
exercise. As defined in the US Department of Justice 1984 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, “a market is defined as a product or group of 
products and a geographical area in which it is sold such that a 
hypothetical, profit maximising firm, not subject to price regulation, that 
was the only present and future seller of those products in that area 
would impose a ‘small but significant and non-transitory’ increase in 
price above prevailing or likely future levels.” 
Switch 
Part of a mobile or fixed telephone system that routes telephone calls to 
their destination. 
TPN 
Technological Protection Measure. Technologies, devices or components 
which in the normal course of their operation serve to prevent or restrict 
acts in respect to copyrighted work which are not authorised by the 
author or subsequent right holders.  
UHF Band 
Ultra High Frequency Band. 
ULL 
Unbundled Local Loop. See LLU. 
UMTS 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. The European term for third-
generation mobile cellular systems or IMT-2000 based on the W-CDMA 
standard. 
Universal access 
Refers to reasonable telecommunication access for all. Includes universal 
service for those that can afford individual telephone service and 
widespread provision of public telephones within a reasonable distance 
of others. 
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VoB 
Voice over Broadband. The generic term used to describe VoIP services that 
allow users to make and receive calls over a broadband access connection 
- for example digital subscriber line (DSL) or cable. (see also VoIP, DSL, 
Fibre Optic Cable) 
VoIP 
Voice over IP. The generic term used to describe the techniques used to 
carry voice traffic over IP (see also IP) 
WACC 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital. A calculation of a firm's cost of capital in 
which each category of capital is proportionately weighted. 
WAPECS 
Wireless Access Platforms for Electronic Communications Services. 
WBA-Wireless Broadband Access. See BWA. 
W-CDMA 
Wideband Code Division Multiple Access. A third-generation mobile 
standard first deployed in Japan. 
WiMax 
A standards-based technology enabling the delivery of last mile wireless 
broadband access as an alternative to cable and DSL. 
Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) 
Refers to Wireless Fidelity, the 802.11b specification for Wireless LANs 
from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). It is part 
of a series of wireless specifications which also includes 802.11a, and 
802.11g. 
Wireless LAN (WLAN) 
A wireless network whereby a user can connect to a local area network 
(LAN) through a wireless (radio) connection, as an alternative to a wired 
local area network. The most popular standard for wireless LANs is the 
IEEE 802.11 series. 
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Wireless 
Generic term for mobile communication services which do not use fixed 
link networks for direct access to the subscriber. 
WLR 
Wholesale Line Rental. 
xDSL 
While DSL stands for digital subscriber line, xDSL is the general 
representation for various types of digital subscriber line technology, 
such as ADSL (asynchronous digital subscriber line), HDSL (high bit-rate 
digital subscriber line), or VHDSL (very high bit-rate digital subscriber 
line). 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
CEPT: European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations 
COCOM: Communications Committee 
ENISA: European Network and Information Security Agency 
ERG: European Regulators Group 
ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
GE-06: Geneva 2006 Agreement 
IRG: Independent Regulators Group 
ITU: International Telecommunication Union 
NCA: National Competition Authority 
NRA: National Regulatory Authority 
NRF: New Regulatory Framework 
RSC: Radio Spectrum Committee 
RSPG: Radio Spectrum Policy Group 
SMA: Spectrum Management Authority 
WRC-07: World Radiocommunication Conference 2007  
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